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Donors’ Influence Strategies and Beneficiary Accountability:  
An NGO Case Study 
 
Abstract  
Previous research on NGO accountability have focused on the constraining features of NGOs’ 
accountability to donors. We argue that donor accountability of NGOs also has enabling 
features which can be mobilised to the advantage of beneficiaries. Drawing on a fieldwork-
based case study design in this paper, we show that how powerful stakeholders like donors can 
influence NGOs, and in that process facilitate beneficiary accountability. We have found that 
donors have applied ‘direct usage’ (influence NGOs directly by controlling critical resources) 
and ‘indirect usage’ (influence NGOs indirectly via other stakeholders such as regulators) 
strategies in holding the case NGO to account.  
Highlights 
 This paper is concerned with finding ways for the improvement of NGOs’ accountability 
to beneficiaries. 
 We have argued against the tendency to view donor accountability versus beneficiary 
accountability as dichotomous. 
 While previous studies have focused on the constraining features of NGOs’ accountability 
to donors we highlight in-built enabling features of NGOs’ accountability to donors which 
can be mobilised to the enhancement of beneficiary accountability.  
 Our results show that powerful NGO stakeholders like donors have applied various 
influence strategies in holding the case NGO to account for their beneficiaries.  
 
Keywords: Bangladesh, beneficiary accountability, case study, donor accountability, NGO 
accountability, stakeholders 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The accountability relationships between NGOs, donors and beneficiaries have been of 
significant interest in the NGO accountability literature (Rahmani, 2012). Prior research on 
NGO accountability (Dixon, Ritchi, & Siwale, 2006; Ebrahim, 2003; O'Dwyer & Unerman, 
2008) argued that in the process of upward accountability to donors by NGOs (donor 
accountability in brief), their accountability towards beneficiaries (beneficiary accountability 
in brief) had been compromised. This is an unintended consequence of the NGO accountability 
process. We argue that while the literature has rightly noted the constraining features of NGOs’ 
accountability to donors, there are some enabling features of donor accountability which has 
been neglected in the academic research on NGO accountability (but see Yasmin, Ghafran, & 
Haniffa, 2018). We contribute by picking this up and highlighting these under-researched 
enabling features of donor accountability which facilitate beneficiary accountability. Donors 
have significant power and influence on NGOs which can be mobilised to facilitate beneficiary 
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accountability. Our central research questions are: how do donors’ influence strategies enable 
NGOs’ accountability to beneficiaries? And, what are the impacts of donors’ influence 
strategies on beneficiary accountability? We explore these under-researched inter-linked 
questions in the context of our case study organisation – BRAC1. 
 
Research on NGOs is also important because it can provide us “unusual or extreme context” 
for research because of their main focus on values over profit, social and environmental issues, 
engagement with multiple major stakeholders and “action-oriented” approaches (see, Hall & 
O’Dwyer, 2017, p.1). There  is a call in the NGO accountability literature to hold NGOs 
accountable to their beneficiaries (see, Ebrahim, 2005; O'Dwyer & Unerman, 2008; Unerman 
& O'Dwyer, 2006a). While some prior research (e.g., Connolly & Hyndman, 2017; Dixon, et 
al., 2006; O'Dwyer & Unerman, 2007; O’Leary, 2017) addressed the issue of beneficiary 
accountability, very little is known to date as to how stakeholders’ collaboration could help 
improve NGOs’ accountability to poor and marginalised beneficiaries. This research attempts 
to fill this gap. 
 
In this case study, we examine the accountability practices of a large international development 
NGO based in Bangladesh – BRAC. Our key motivation for this case study comes from the 
sheer size, power and influence of BRAC on many poor and marginalised people from 11 
developing countries, including Bangladesh. It employs approximately 100,000 employees and 
already reached to more than 138 million poor and marginalised people (www.brac.net, 1 
November, 2018). BRAC’s key programmes include microfinance, health, education and 
WASH (Water, Sanitation and Hygiene). Originally BRAC was set up to reduce poverty from 
a war-torn country in the 1970s. Although BRAC was almost fully dependent on donors for 
funding, over time it has reduced donor dependency by generating profits from commercial 
activities. BRAC's involvement in a diverse range of commercial activities, including 
commercial banking, agriculture and manufacturing, makes it look like a business 
conglomerate. Some critics argued that BRAC’s engagement with commercial activities, such 
as commercial banking, was beyond its mandate as a charitable organisation, and the move was 
faced with resistance from a regulator, civil society and commercial sectors in Bangladesh 
(Sidel, 2004). The enormity of its operations has made it look like a parallel state, according to 
a BBC documentary (Phinney, 2007, June 23rd). We have chosen this very ‘unusual’ (Hall & 
O’Dwyer, 2017) and important context of BRAC to study the issue of NGO accountability. 
Some prominent social science scholars  (e.g., Mair & Marti, 2009; McKague, Zietsma, & 
Oliver, 2015) already published scholarly papers on BRAC.  
 
NGOs in developing countries receive funding from large institutional donors such as DfID 
(Department for International Development, UK), Dutch Government, USAID and AusAid2. 
These institutional donors get involved in aid delivery in partnership with NGOs from aid 
receiving countries to meet the commitments of the donors’ home governments. One of the 
main purposes of the aid delivery is to improve the lives of poor and marginalised people 
through specific funding activities. It is argued in the literature (Ebrahim, 2005) that 
accountability to stakeholders (e.g. beneficiaries) helps improve aid effectiveness. Although 
there are apparent agreements among scholars, practitioners, and policy makers regarding the 
need for better beneficiary accountability (see, O'Dwyer & Unerman, 2008), little is known as 
to how it can be materialised. Given the perceived lack of power of the beneficiaries in holding 
NGOs to account, we argue that powerful stakeholders, such as donors, can play an enabling 
role in making NGOs accountable to their beneficiaries. 
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The exploration of the enabling features of donor accountability is important for two reasons. 
Firstly, these features have been neglected in prior research and we aim to respond to the call 
for research in this area (see, Ebrahim, 2005; O'Dwyer & Unerman, 2008; Unerman & 
O'Dwyer, 2006a). Moreover, we believe that this has important implications for NGO 
accountability related policy and practice. Secondly, given not only the vulnerability and 
exploitability (Belal, Cooper, & Roberts, 2013) of the beneficiaries in developing countries, 
but also the unwillingness or lack of capacity of the developing country governments and their 
regulators (Ahmed, 2008) to hold NGOs to account, donors have the required power and 
influence which can be positively mobilised to the advantage of beneficiaries.  
Drawing from Frooman (1999) we argue that the significant powers held by the donors might 
allow them to apply direct or indirect usage strategies to facilitate NGOs’ accountability 
towards beneficiaries (beneficiary accountability thereafter). Direct usage strategies enable the 
donors to enforce their requirements (including beneficiary accountability) by attaching some 
conditionalities related to the use of funding. Indirect strategies involve collaboration with 
other NGO stakeholders, such as regulators, to achieve intended purposes. 
 
Our contributions are both theoretical and empirical. Firstly, drawing from Frooman (1999) we 
introduce a theoretical framework to the NGO accountability literature on how beneficiary 
accountability can be operationalised by mobilising the enabling features of donor 
accountability. Theoretically, we show how various usage strategies can be deployed to achieve 
the intended goal of beneficiary accountability. Secondly, we provide empirical illustrations in 
support of our theoretical arguments by bringing in evidence from the case study of a large 
international NGO operating in Bangladesh. Our aim is not only to provide theoretical 
arguments but also to add empirical meat to the theoretical skeleton. Finally, improvement of 
beneficiaries’ lives and their empowerment via enhanced beneficiary accountability is one of 
the major concerns of NGO accountability scholars (see, Agyemang, Awumbila, Unerman, & 
O’Dwyer, 2009b; O'Dwyer & Boomsma, 2015; Unerman & O'Dwyer, 2006a). However, how 
it is to be achieved remains a challenge for scholars, NGO practitioners and policy makers. We 
address these concerns by exploring how beneficiary accountability can be facilitated by 
invoking the enabling features of donor accountability. While acknowledging the constraining 
features of donor accountability we note that currently there is inadequate exploration of the 
enabling features of donor accountability, which facilitates beneficiary accountability. We 
attempt to fill this gap.  
In the next section of this paper, we explain theoretical perspectives adopted in the paper. We 
then proceed to undertake a brief review of prior research on NGO accountability. In the fourth 
section, we explain the research method adopted to achieve the objective of this study. The 
penultimate section provides the empirical illustrations of theoretical arguments provided 
earlier in the paper. The final section of the paper offers a discussion and conclusion based on 
earlier results and their analysis. 
2. Theoretical perspectives 
Goetz & Jenkins (2005, as cited in McGee and Gaventa 2010, p.7) argue that accountability 
“ideally involves both answerability – the responsibility of duty-bearers to provide information 
and justification about their actions – and enforceability – the possibility of penalties or 
consequences for failing to answer accountability claims”. In the case of NGOs, the notion of 
accountability can also be understood as an ‘ex-ante and (or) ex-post’ (McGee & Gaventa, 
2010, p.7). ‘Ex-ante’ accountability is about holding an agent (NGO) accountable for decisions 
(Pollmann, Potters, & Trautmann, 2014). In the case of ‘ex-ante’ accountability, accountors like 
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NGOs can make all the necessary information regarding the programme available in advance 
so that accountees (e.g. beneficiaries) can learn or participate in decision making which are 
going to affect their lives (McGee & Gaventa, 2010, p.7). Ebrahim (2003) argues that 
beneficiary participation can be a suitable accountability mechanism to discharge 
accountability to them. By applying participatory approaches, NGO officials can discharge 
accountability through ‘closeness’ (see Gray, Bebbington, & Collison, 2006). These authors 
argue that through close interactions with NGO officials, some of the information needs of 
beneficiaries are met. Mulgan (2000) and Uche, Adegbite and Jones (2016) argue that 
accountability is a ‘dialectical activity’. From this point of view, the dialogue between an 
organisation and its stakeholders may take the form of ‘open discussion and debates’, 
‘questioning, assessing and criticising’ (Mulgan, 2000, p. p. 569). Participatory approaches 
should allow NGO beneficiaries ask relevant questions to NGO officials about the actions 
which affect their lives.     
On the other hand, ‘ex-post’ accountability is about holding an agent (NGO) accountable for 
outcomes (Pollmann, et al., 2014). In the case of NGOs, donors can check whether programmes 
are implemented according to the plan or not. It can be done through monitoring the programme 
implementation, evaluating the post-implementation impacts and learning lessons from 
mistakes (Ebrahim, 2003). In developing countries, large institutional donors set an 
accountability agenda at the funding approval stage (‘ex-ante’ accountability) and demand 
programme implementation related information in order to verify conformity (‘ex-post’ 
accountability). We argue that some of the participatory approaches adopted and implemented 
by NGOs can come from donors’ ‘ex-ante’ and ‘ex-post’ accountability requirements. 
When there is a question of enforceability there is a question of power. Ebrahim (2003)  argues 
that power is a key factor in NGO-stakeholders accountability relationships, and it is important 
to address the power differential between an NGO and its beneficiaries in order to ensure 
‘downward accountability’. NGO beneficiaries in poor countries do not have much economic 
power or awareness which allow them to hold an NGO to account. In the absence of 
beneficiaries’ power and unwillingness/inability of the state and the regulatory agencies 
(Ahmed, 2008) in countries, such as Bangladesh, in holding NGOs to account, what is the way 
forward? 
Drawing on existing literature, Mitchell, Agle, and Wood (1997) argue that stakeholders’ power 
is a ‘crucial variable’ in explaining organisation-stakeholder relations (p.863), and monitoring 
of the behaviour of an organisation by a powerful stakeholder can make its demand ‘urgent’ to 
the focal organisation (see, p.867). By exercising power, a stakeholder can “bring about the 
outcomes they desire”  (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1974). Major sources of stakeholders’ power can 
be economical, political (Freeman & Reed, 1983) and regulatory. A particular stakeholder can 
control valuable resources that an organisation needs for its survival. By controlling the 
resource supply, a stakeholder can try to control the behaviour of an organisation (Salancik & 
Pfeffer, 1974). An organisation may also seek political support from influential stakeholders, 
such as donors (Ahmed, 2008). During a crisis period, this type of political support can help an 
organisation continue to attract resources for its survival. Regulators and policy makers can be 
other influential stakeholder groups with significant power. The power of a regulator can come 
from its ability to control the critical resources and to allow an organisation to operate.  
The sources of power in an NGO context include control of valuable resources (e.g. funding) 
provided by a donor. An NGO becomes dependent on donors, when they control the valuable 
resources that are critical for its survival (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). In addition to the provision 
of funding, donors sometimes provide other support, such as, ‘technical support’  
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(Nunnenkamp, 1995) for capacity building of NGOs. NGOs in developing countries, such as 
Bangladesh, also receive political support from donors. For example, institutional donors such 
as DfID enjoy strong backing from its host governments in terms of promoting its agenda 
through NGOs in developing countries. When NGOs face obstacles in implementing those 
agenda, donor countries put pressures on aid receiving countries’ governments for removing 
the obstacles. In Bangladesh, government had to back down a number of times while trying to 
restrict activities of NGOs (Ahmed, 2008). This type of political support seems crucial for the 
survival of NGOs in countries such as Bangladesh, and can be treated as a ‘resource’ for donors. 
The dependency of NGOs on donors for these types of resources can be the source of power, 
and help the donors in holding NGOs to account. By utilising their power, large institutional 
donors can influence NGOs in developing countries in enacting accountability mechanisms 
which are appropriate. However, large western donors may not be there forever to monitor the 
accountability practices of NGOs in developing countries, or there may be capacity constraints 
on the part of large donors in demanding their accountability requirements. In these cases, 
donors can influence funded NGOs’ accountability agenda by collaborating with other 
powerful stakeholders (Frooman, 1999) such as NGO regulators. Drawing on existing 
stakeholder theory literature, Miles  (2017) classifies stakeholders into four different types: 
influencer, collaborator, recipient and claimant. A stakeholder becomes ‘influencer’ if it has 
the ‘capacity’ to affect a focal organisation’s operations and “an active strategy to do so” (p. 
450).  On the other hand, a collaborator ‘cooperates’ with a focal organisation even though it 
possess the power to influence, but abstain from doing so (Miles, 2017) . Recipients are those 
stakeholders who are passively affected by the actions of a focal organisation. Finally, 
according to Miles (2017), claimants are those stakeholders whose claims derive from “moral, 
social or residual rights rather than legal, direct or economic claim associated with the power 
to influence” (p. 451).  Although regulators in developing countries are powerful stakeholders, 
some of them may not have sufficient organisational capacity and active strategies to influence 
behaviours of NGOs which makes them collaborators. With the help of financial and capacity 
building support from large institutional donors, these regulators in developing countries can 
become ‘influencers.   
Drawing on resource dependence perspective and stakeholders’ power (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978), Frooman (1999, p. P. 194) outlines two types of stakeholder influence strategies, namely, 
withholding strategy and usage strategy. He uses empirical evidence from an environmental 
organisation’s (EII) successful campaign on consumers’ boycott of StarKist’s tuna in order to 
force them to stop buying tuna from foreign tuna fishing companies which used a controversial 
method of netting tuna resulting in dolphin deaths (see Frooman, 1999).  
Withholding strategy can be applied by giving a threat to discontinue resource supply or actual 
discontinuation of resource supply to an organisation with a view to controlling its behaviours 
(Frooman, 1999). Withholding strategy works where a stakeholder tries to influence the 
behaviour of an organisation by exerting a ‘credible threat’ (Pfeffer & Leong, 1977) of 
withdrawing resources unless an organisation changes its behaviour. He also argues that these 
strategies can be effective when the stakeholder is not dependent on the focal organisation. In 
the EII-StarKist scenario, the threat of boycotting StarKist’s tuna by consumers was a 
withholding strategy by consumers.  
 
In the case of usage strategy, a stakeholder continues to provide resources, but the focal 
organisation has to comply with certain conditionalities attached to its use (Frooman, 1999). If 
the focal organisation wants to have access to the resources continuously, the conditionalities 
have to be complied with. By using the usage strategy, a stakeholder tries to control the use of 
resource by the focal organisation in the way the stakeholder desires. In the EII-StarKist 
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example, the author shows that by facing a consumers’  boycott, StarKist utilized a usage 
strategy to force foreign tuna fishing companies to change their method of tuna netting 
(Frooman, 1999).  
For NGOs, in most cases there are ‘strings attached’ to funding from large institutional donors. 
If the focal NGO fails to comply, funding can be discontinued. Drawing on Gargiulo (1993), 
Frooman (1999) argues that a stakeholder can influence the behaviours of an organisation 
directly or indirectly. By applying direct strategy, a stakeholder can control the supply of 
resources, either by adopting a withholding or usage strategy. A stakeholder can also apply 
indirect strategy through collaboration with another stakeholder who can influence the firm, 
either by adopting either withholding or usage strategy (Frooman, 1999). In the EII-StarKist 
scenario, although EII did not have economic power on StarKist, it collaborated with 
consumers (indirect strategy) to force StarKist stop buying tuna from foreign tuna fishing 
companies which used the controversial fishing nets (Frooman, 1999). In his article, Frooman 
(1999) also predicted four propositions predicting which type of strategy a stakeholder would 
choose to change the behaviour of a focal organisation. By analysing evidence from four 
environmental NGOs as stakeholders, Hendry (2005) expanded Frooman’s framework and 
proposed two more propositions. However, this aspect of the stakeholders’ influence strategies 
framework is beyond the scope of this paper.  
Frooman’s (1999) framework has also been used in other contexts. For example, Elijido-Ten, 
Kloot, & Clarkson (2010) applied this typology in predicting preferred intervention strategies 
to be chosen by stakeholders of two Malaysian companies in demanding ‘desired’ 
environmental disclosures. Henriques & Sharma (2005) used stakeholders’ influence strategy 
in the context of Canadian Forest Industry to show that less powerful stakeholders could 
increase their ‘salience’ (Mitchell, et al., 1997) by collaborating with powerful stakeholders 
who could control the resource flow of the focal organisation. In this paper, we have used 
Frooman’s framework to explore how a stakeholder can influence the behaviour of a large 
NGO. 
3. Prior research on NGO accountability 
NGOs in developing countries engage in accountability activities with key stakeholders, such 
as donors, regulators and beneficiaries. Among these stakeholders, NGO beneficiaries in de-
veloping countries do not have much economic power. In many cases, they are marginalised 
groups with little or no literacy. In spite of being one of the key stakeholders, prior research 
shows that NGOs mostly ignore their accountability to these poor and marginalised beneficiar-
ies (Dixon, et al., 2006). Although there are arguments for accountability to all the affected 
stakeholders (Unerman & O'Dwyer, 2006b), including beneficiaries, research showing how it 
can be materialised is scarce.  
 
Large institutional donors, such as DfID, are economically and politically influential and pow-
erful. There are two major sources of influence of these large institutional donors. The main 
source of influence is their financial resource/funding (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) which is crit-
ical for the survival of many NGOs in developing countries. Another source of influence of 
large bilateral donors is the backing of their home governments. Western governments, such as 
United States of America and United Kingdom, often use foreign aid as a tool to promote trade 
(Yorke, 2018, August 28) and democracy. They often exert political pressures on governments 
of developing countries in creating and maintaining favourable working environment for NGOs 
because there is an assumption that NGOs and civil societies in developing countries promote 
western-type democracy (Haque, 2002). NGOs in developing countries often seek assistance 
from donor countries if they face hostile policies from their host governments. For example, 
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Ahmed (2008) shows that government of Bangladesh had to back down from introducing strin-
gent NGO regulations on numerous occasions due to lobbying from western governments. This 
type of political backing of bilateral donors from their home governments is another source of 
influence. These donors can use their political influence in holding funded NGOs to account. 
 
NGOs’ accountability to donors and beneficiaries are not mutually exclusive. Donor 
accountability of NGOs can be mobilised to facilitate beneficiary accountability (Connolly & 
Hyndman, 2017). However, prior research has noted that NGOs prioritise their accountability 
to donors at the possible expense of beneficiary accountability. For example, in a study on 
human rights NGO, Amnesty Ireland, O’Dwyer and Unerman (2008) have explored the 
emergence of accountability mechanisms and have shown that historically Amnesty Ireland’s 
accountability was internally focused and mission-centric. Although managers of Amnesty 
were in favour of ‘holistic accountability’ and its strategic plan stated “the need for internal 
accountability protocols”, which was informal and “less rule-based” (p.809), a ‘hierarchical’ 
type of external accountability started to dominate Amnesty’s accountability practices. The 
practice was adopted in the context of Amnesty’s desire to “attract further funding and support” 
from institutional donors (p.810). In the absence of demand for beneficiary accountability, the 
organisation was prioritising external accountability, although the practice was perceived to be 
unhelpful toward achieving Amnesty’s mission (2008). Concern has been expressed in prior 
research that this type of externally-driven accountability could cause a ‘mission drift’ (Epstein 
& Kristi, 2011; Epstein & Yuthas, 2010). Drawing on another case study on a Zambian Micro 
Finance NGO, Dixon et al., (2006) showed that in the absence of “appropriate oversight and 
failure to institute or maintain appropriate accountability mechanism” (p.415) the case study 
organisation had nearly collapsed during a period of rapid expansion. The authors argued that 
such failure prompted donor’s stringent accountability requirements, which ultimately 
translated into more accountability requirements from the loan officers to the senior 
management. Dixon et al. (2006) also argued that, due to pressures from the senior 
management, the loan officers had to spend more time for reporting purposes and compromised 
their accountability to beneficiaries by reducing the quality time required for an effective micro 
finance intervention. In another study, Markowitz and Tice (2002) have also shown that, due 
to the ‘professional’ requirements from donors, ‘a grass root-oriented’ NGO transformed into 
a hierarchical ‘service delivery’ organisation and lost its ‘grassroots links’ (cited in Elbers & 
Arts, 2011, p.715). Khan (2008, p.78) argued that due to the donor pressures for self-
sustainability of NGOs in the early 1990s a micro finance organisation changed its 
organisational identity from a ‘social service’ NGO into a regulated commercial bank, while 
pursuing a self-sustainability agenda. He argued that, while coping with the external pressures, 
the organisation followed “an objective of self-sustainability with cost control, profitability”, 
and relegated the ‘social service’ agenda to the ‘secondary’ level (p.83). Donors’ accountability 
is also criticised for their rigidness (Agyemang, et al., 2009b), lack of cultural sensitivity 
(Wallace, Bornstein, & Chapman, 2006), contextual incompatibility (Rahmani, 2012) and 
short-term focus  (Dixon & McGregor, 2011).   
While some of the above studies show that donor accountability has its own limitations and 
negative effects on beneficiary accountability, recent literature (Agyemang, O’Dwyer, 
Unerman, & Awumbila, 2017; Yasmin, et al., 2018) has started to unpack some of the positive 
aspects of donor accountability in facilitating beneficiary accountability. Drawing on the 
perceptions of NGO field workers, Agyemang, et al. (2017) argue that NGO donors can be 
flexible in their approach, and have shown some ‘responsiveness’ and eagerness to listen to the 
challenges faced by the field workers in delivering effective programmes. They argue that 
donors’ engagement with the field staff helps build confidence in donor accountability and 
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raises “some possibility of aligning funder accountability demands better with their felt 
responsibilities ….” (p.18). This is aimed at improving the lives of NGO beneficiaries. Prior 
research also shows that some donors want to help NGOs in discharging better beneficiary 
accountability (O'Dwyer & Unerman, 2007).  
Frooman (1999) notes that accountability relationships between an organisation and its 
stakeholders go beyond ‘dyadic’ organisation-stakeholder relationship. Rowley (1997, p. 907) 
argues that organisations “don’t respond to each stakeholder individually, but instead must 
answer the simultaneous demands of multiple stakeholders”. When more than one powerful 
stakeholders take collective actions, they can influence the performance of an organisation 
(Bakker & Hond, 2008; Scott & Meyer, 1991). Stakeholders can form alliances to pursue a 
common interest (King, 2008). Even a less powerful stakeholder can influence the behaviour 
of an organisation by collaborating with another powerful stakeholder (Frooman, 1999). In the 
case of NGOs, we understand that donors may lose much of their influence on a funded NGO 
if their funding is discontinued or an NGO becomes self-sustainable. We argue that donors still 
can influence NGOs’ accountability process to beneficiaries by collaborating with regulators. 
 
While the above review of prior research shows that the impact of donor accountability on 
beneficiary is not always negative, there is a dearth of research that have examined the 
potentials of donor accountability in complementing beneficiary accountability. By drawing on 
views of a number of stakeholders, we examine how donors influence can facilitate such 
accountability process. 
 
4. Research Method 
 
4.1 The case context 
The paper is a part of a large case study which explored the dynamics of accountability in a 
large Bangladeshi NGO called BRAC. In this paper, we report a theme within this case study 
which examines the role of donors in making BRAC accountable to its beneficiaries. The other 
themes of the project are being reported elsewhere. The data sources of the project include a 
series of semi-structured interviews, observation and focus group with relevant stakeholders. 
 
BRAC is a large Bangladeshi NGO with international operations. According to the ranking 
published by the Switzerland-based journal, The Global Journal, BRAC secured the topmost 
position among the world’s top 450 NGOs based on three criteria – “impact, innovation and 
sustainability” (Staff-Correspondent, 2013). On 15th June, 2007 BBC 4 Radio’s presenter 
Richard Phinney presented a programme titled -Titans of Aid - where he was asking the 
question, “whether BRAC, the largest NGO in the world is the answer to fighting global 
poverty or an extraordinary charity running out of control?” (Phinney, 2007, June 23rd). It was 
established in 1972, immediately after the independence of Bangladesh, in order to help 
displaced refugees from India. Gradually, it expanded its operation to include development 
works that were fully supported by international donors to achieve two objectives – poverty 
alleviation and empowerment of poor and marginalised beneficiaries. Initially, BRAC 
developed a number of programmes, such as micro finance (MF), health, education and income 
generating ventures for poor and marginalised beneficiaries so that they could receive services 
from BRAC and became self-sustainable. Over time, BRAC has adopted a strategy of 
commercialisation of some of its programmes, like MF, dairy farm and AArong (a handicraft 
business), which has opened avenues for making profit, and thereby reduced donor 
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dependency. BRAC still mostly relies on donor funding for its social development programmes 
(e.g. education, water, sanitation and hygiene -WASH and health). Currently, BRAC operates 
in 11 countries including Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Nepal and Sudan. So far, it reached to 113 
million beneficiaries in Bangladesh alone, and disbursed USD 9,233.10 million cumulative 
loans to its beneficiaries (BRAC Annual Report, 2011, p.71). It also runs a university and partly 
or fully owns a number of big commercial organisations including two financial institutions. 
While 100% of BRAC’s annual budget used to come from donor in the 1980s, now it generates 
76% of its annual funding from non-donor sources, such as member savings, profit from 
business activities and borrowing from commercial banks (BRAC, 2013). It is gradually 
becoming more independent from the donor agencies for its income generating programmes, 
however, the bulk of funding for social programmes comes from donors as noted earlier. 
BRAC’s main donors include DfID (Department for International Development, UK), Dutch 
Government, Australian Aid, The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), The Global Fund 
and Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). 
 
4.2 Data collection and analysis 
As the main research objective of this paper is to examine the enabling features of donor 
accountability in relation to beneficiary accountability, we have carefully selected the key 
informants so that rich insights could be provided. Our key informants for this paper include 
BRAC’s managers, donors, funders, regulators, NGO beneficiaries, NGO professionals from 
competitor and partner NGOs and an NGO apex body. These are the people who are directly 
involved in the accountability negotiation process between BRAC and its donors and/or have 
in-depth knowledge on the issue. BRAC employees include senior managers, mid-level 
managers and field managers. Officials who play direct role in setting BRAC's policies and 
make strategic decisions, such as Executive Director, Directors and Head of Programmes, are 
categorised as senior managers. Officials who are responsible for operational and supervisory 
activities and participate in key organisational decisions, such as Deputy Directors, Managers, 
are classified as mid-level managers and field officials who have supervisory responsibilities 
in the field, such as Branch Managers, are classified as field managers. As this is a single case 
study, detail profiling of the interviewees is avoided to maintain the anonymity. However, some 
details of interviewees are provided in Table 1. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
A total number of 68 face-to-face semi-structured interviews and 9 focus group interviews were 
conducted during initial two field visits between the period January 2010 and July 2011 for the 
large project. For the purpose of face-to-face interviews, 31 interviewees were selected from 
BRAC employees, 14 from beneficiaries (for one-to-one interviews), 5 from competitors or 
partner NGOs, 4 from donors and funders, 4 from regulators and government officials, 4 from 
civil society, 2 from local elected representatives, 3 from religious leaders and 1 from an NGO 
apex body. The first author collected some additional data between April 2017 and July 2017. 
During these visits, the author interviewed one more participant from the MRA (Microfinance 
Regulatory Authority) and two more participants from DfID, which funded the MRA’s 
capacity building, training and an introduction of complaints handling mechanism. These data 
updates have helped us identify the effectiveness of earlier accountability 
mechanism/initiatives3 (e.g., the introduction of a telephone hotline for affected stakeholders, 
including beneficiaries so that they can complain to the regulator against MFIs) adopted by the 
MRA. 
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We have used data from a total number of 21 face-to-face semi-structured relevant interviews 
(with 18 interviewees) and three focus group interviews for this paper. A total of 3 interviewees 
were re-interviewed to seek further clarifications on the previous opinions where contradictions 
were identified or new issues emerged during the analysis of first set of data. These 18 
interviewees are the key informants relating to the research questions addressed in this paper. 
For example, our interviewees from BRAC include those who have the responsibilities to 
engage with/negotiate directly with donors, regulator and beneficiaries, or have supervision 
responsibilities.  Out of these 21 interviews, 18 of them were conducted between January 2010 
and July, 2011. The rest of the three interviews were conducted between April 2017 and July 
2017. 18 of these interviews were digitally recorded and transcribed. Three of the interviewees 
declined to digitally record the conversations. Detailed notes were also taken just after the 
interviews. Normally, each interview lasted between 40 minutes and 90 minutes. We have also 
analysed and used data from documents, such as WASH project proposals, and three 
beneficiary focus group discussions. The focus group discussions were organised before 
conducting one-to-one interviews with beneficiaries, and interviewees were selected from the 
focus group participants. Three Village WASH Committee (VWC) meetings were also 
observed. These observations helped us understand the dynamics of local level decisions made 
by the beneficiaries and their interactions with BRAC officials. Detailed notes were taken 
during the observations.  
 
NVivo software has been used to manage data handling during the data analysis phase. For data 
analysis we have followed the procedures of data reduction, data display and conclusion 
drawing as suggested by Miles, Huberman, and Saldana (2013) and O'Dwyer (2004). We have 
used theoretical categories developed earlier in the paper as tentative frame to structure the data 
analysis. This meant that there were several iterations between data and theory until we settled 
on the final structure reported below. 
 
5. Findings and analysis 
 
In this section, we report empirical findings of this study and analyse them in the light of the 
theoretical perspectives and prior research discussed earlier in the paper. 
5.1 Direct usage strategy and beneficiary accountability 
 
According to our interviewees [BRAC officials and donor representatives], donors play an 
active role in setting BRAC's accountability agenda to beneficiaries. BRAC's donors have used 
direct usage strategy in order to influence BRAC’s behaviour towards its beneficiaries. Donors 
did so by controlling the use of their resources. Evidence from our case study shows that donors 
insist BRAC to include various beneficiary accountability mechanisms within a project. For 
example, one BRAC interviewee [senior manager] notes that in the process of demonstrating 
the impact of aid money, donors make beneficiary accountability requirements as part of a 
project proposal: 
 
Donors are becoming more and more performance-driven with respect to donor dollar. 
Every donor wants to see that every dollar spent has … [the] largest amount of impact. 
So, [the issue of] performance [is] becoming very important. Because [there are] 
debates around aid [effectiveness], and [there is] huge pressure [on donors] to 
demonstrate [how] aid [is] … making a difference. [In terms of] downward 
accountability, some donors are making it [beneficiary accountability] as part of the 
project design. [BR1] 
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Donors appear to support the above view. For example, one of the donor representatives (D1) 
notes that beneficiary participation is one of the hallmarks of donor-funded project, and funded 
NGOs have to include the provision of participation to demonstrate that needs are assessed 
based on beneficiary consultations: 
I don’t think any programme is designed without their [beneficiaries’] participation. … 
[in] every programme, usually beneficiaries are involved. … Most of them [NGOs] use 
PRA [Participatory Rural Appraisal 4 ] method to talk to beneficiaries. So, of course 
beneficiaries should be involved, need to be involved. One has to design programme 
according to their needs…… There has to be [a] very strong indication [that] the [NGO] 
organizers have the proposal … where beneficiaries have been consulted. [D1] 
 
Unlike prior research (e.g., Dixon, et al., 2006; Ebrahim, 2003) our interviewees note that donor 
accountability and beneficiary accountability are not mutually exclusive, rather inter-linked. 
For example, one BRAC’s senior manager contends: 
But, donor accountability also needs to be deconstructed. Donor accountability is based 
on downward accountability. …, when you get money for a particular project you have to 
basically say that you do certain activities and you have to prove how the activities going 
to have the kind of impact on the final beneficiaries. And all the reporting is based on that 
premise. So, donor accountability is basically reporting on how we have been able to 
implement the activities and through which, to what extent we have been able to have an 
impact on the lives of people [beneficiaries] we affect. [BR1] 
Our donor interviewees also opine that donors prefer to see an element of beneficiary 
accountability within the project proposal and, if this is not there already, NGOs will have to 
include it in the project: 
We really want to see this [beneficiary participation] within our projects. This [is] an 
element of project design and project formulation. If it is not there, we will ask for it to be 
inserted later. (Donor representative, D1) 
 
The opportunity to insert any donor-preferred missing components, such as beneficiary 
participation at various stages of a project, in BRAC's proposal comes when donors’ advisors 
interact with BRAC officials during the proposal scrutiny stage. In line with the opinion 
expressed by the above donor representative, one of the mid-level managers (BR2) of BRAC 
acknowledges that donors do not accept BRAC's proposals without raising their queries and 
funding proposals are only accepted once BRAC accommodates feedback given by donor 
advisors: 
We write a brief proposal and submit it to donors. Every donor agency [scrutinizes] it. You 
will see there are advisors for every project. For example, there is an advisor/specialist for 
an education project…. That means they [donors] have the expertise. When we submit 
proposals, their experts review the proposals. After reviewing proposals, they raise 
questions. ……   We clarify our positions.  If we make any mistake that will be detected [by 
a donor advisor]. After fine tuning [by a donor advisor] a final proposal is prepared. (BR2) 
 
P ; ｪ W  づ  ヱン 
Ebrahim (2003) argues that capacity building of an NGO and its staff is a pre-condition for 
beneficiary accountability. Our interviewees suggest that ‘capacity building’ and 
‘empowerment’ of NGO beneficiaries are also key in helping them demand accountability. For 
example, one donor representative (D2) argues: 
… it’s often not [the] question of disseminating information to beneficiaries. But it is 
very much building their capacity and empowering them to claim their rights and 
moving away from the concept of user groups towards rights-holders and act of citizens.  
… I have not yet really seen [this] within [the] BRAC’s programmes. I find still very 
much, especially in the WATSAN [Water and Sanitation] programme, that their user 
groups … are not sufficiently empowered to deal with [the] matters by themselves. Once 
BRAC withdraws [its interventions] … [how they] will be able to deal with any other 
issues not related to WATSAN activities. [D2] 
 
Our evidence shows that BRAC’s donors not only allocated resources for capacity building of 
BRAC and its staff, but also allocated resources for capacity building of beneficiaries (WASH 
project proposal, 2005).  
Our evidence also shows that large donors, such as DfID, not only include some accountability 
mechanisms within a specific project, but also use their influence on BRAC’s organisational 
accountability related policymaking. For example, BRAC had to introduce an ‘independent’ 
Ombudsperson service in 2001 in order to comply with donors’ desire. Any aggrieved 
stakeholder (including beneficiaries and staff) affected by BRAC's intervention could lodge 
complaints with the Ombudsperson. One of the BRAC's senior managers [BR1] contends that 
“… we had to put in place [a] grievance [handling] mechanism [Ombudsperson]. It is donor-
driven.” It is clear from the above discussion that BRAC's donors utilised their influence in 
promoting beneficiary accountability by controlling the resource use.   
BRAC's donors not only insist inclusion of beneficiary accountability mechanisms within 
project proposal (ex-ante accountability), but also check the implementation through 
evaluation of various reports prepared by BRAC’s officials and donor appointed consultants 
(ex-post accountability). One of our interviewees [D1] also confirmed that donor officials made 
field visits and directly spoke with beneficiaries to check the implementation progress of a 
project. These types of visits help beneficiaries in sharing their experiences directly with 
donors. Prior research shows that presence of high officials (such as donor representatives) 
helps raise the voice of beneficiaries (Agyemang, Awumbila, & O'Dwyer, 2009a). 
5.2 Indirect usage strategy and beneficiary accountability 
 
Microfinance is the largest programme of BRAC. BRAC's donors do not fund it anymore, and, 
as a result, the donors have little influence on them relating to the largest MF programme. 
However, it did not prevent one large institutional donor (DfID) from influencing BRAC's 
accountability to beneficiaries in these programmes. Frooman (1999) argues that stakeholders 
can influence an organisation’s behaviour through mobilisation of allies. We have found 
evidence of partnership between an institutional donor (DfID) and the microfinance regulator 
in Bangladesh (MRA – Microfinance Regulatory Authority) in making microfinance NGOs 
accountable to Microfinance (MF) beneficiaries. Our evidence shows that BRAC's donors 
partnered with the MRA in promoting beneficiary accountability. They did so by applying the 
‘indirect usage’ strategy. 
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Since 2006 microfinance services provided by NGOs are regulated by the MRA. It has the 
mandate to hold MFIs 5 accountable. Our interviewees note that one of the main responsibilities 
of MRA is to protect the interests of beneficiaries of MFIs: 
The main responsibility of MRA is to ensure accountability…. Our first task is 
public (beneficiary) protection. We check data integrity, whether they are (MF 
NGOs) operating in the same way as they claimed, whether there are 
protections for savings, whether they refund savings, whether pay interest on 
savings, how much service charge is levied on credit etc. Is there any 
exploitation during credit operations? [R1, MRA] 
…the government has set up an organisation called MRA. … they look at the 
overall interest of the beneficiaries, both the borrowers as well as the savers, … 
microcredit regulatory authority has been set up in order to see that whether these 
beneficiaries’ interests are protected”.  [BR5] 
Although MRA had the mandate, our interviewees noted that holding the NGO sector to 
account was a hard task. Our interviewees note that MF/NGO sector in Bangladesh earned 
reputations nationally and internationally6, and the sector was very powerful. Some of the NGO 
leaders maintain very good relationships with the government, which made the regulator’s 
(MRA) job in holding the sector to account difficult.  For example, one regulator notes: 
MRA cannot implement something overnight. The sector is very powerful. [Holding 
MFIs to account] is a power game. This is a new organisation. [The NGO sector] 
did some good work.  ...in some cases, they became parallel to the government. In 
some cases, we saw the government backtracked from its decision because of the 
pressures from NGOs. It happened more than once.  [R1] 
Microfinance is a very large sector in Bangladesh. Specialized finance and insurance products 
are provided by the MFIs. The regulator needs to have technical knowledge and organisational 
capacity in order to hold the MFIs to account. One of the key limitations of regulators in 
Bangladesh is lack of resources and capacity in performing their duties. Our evidence shows 
that donors played an important role by providing crucial financial and capacity building 
support to the MRA. This is indicative of the application of indirect usage strategy. Our 
interviewees (R2, D3 and D4) note that DfID’s support helped them hold MFI’s accountable 
to their beneficiaries. For example, MRA sets up a telephone hotline for microfinance 
beneficiaries so that affected stakeholders, including beneficiaries, can complain to the 
regulator if they are unhappy with the conducts of any MFI [R2, D1, D3 and D4]. The regulator 
also considered taking steps in raising awareness of MF beneficiaries through educating them 
about their rights [R1]. 
There was an accusation against the MF sector in Bangladesh that they charged very high 
interest to poor and marginalised beneficiaries. In some cases, the effective rate of interest was 
as high as 40 percent. The sector had tried to justify the interest by claiming that their operating 
costs were very high because of the small loan size. Our evidence shows that the regulator 
initially failed a number of times to cap the maximum interest rate to be charged: 
We have consulted the sector on a number of proposals [regarding charging 
justifiable interest rates] and the sector rejected almost all of them. After the 
rejection, we conducted an in-house study and recommended a formula regarding 
justifiable service charge. That initiative reached to final stage. But, the 
government postponed it after having discussion with the sector. ….   Following 
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government advice, we have appointed an American firm to recommend a 
justifiable cost of loans and MRA decided to consult various stakeholders. [R1] 
Finally, in 2010 MRA was successful in capping the maximum interest rate at 27% for a MF 
loan7. The above evidence shows that donors’ organisational capacity and resource support was 
instrumental in mobilizing the regulator in holding MFIs in Bangladesh (including BRAC) 
accountable to beneficiaries. The regulator-driven move in capping the maximum interest rate 
has helped MFI (including BRAC) beneficiaries in reducing their debt burden. 
 
5.3 Impacts of donors’ influence strategies on beneficiary accountability 
The WASH proposal included a provision of a ‘bottom-up management’ approach for needs 
assessment and transparent decision-making in the case of resource allocation to the poor and 
marginalised beneficiaries. The implementation of the bottom-up participatory approach 
appeared to be the outcome of donors’ influence on NGOs’ activities via ‘direct usage’ strategy. 
This approach was expected to allow beneficiary participation and promote transparency in 
field-level decision making. It was claimed in the WASH project proposal that: 
Participatory planning will take place, with the committees planning for a core 
of common activities but also formulating plans for activities that reflect their 
own situation and their own assessment…..Transparent and open decision-
making will also need to be ensured, particularly where this involves provision of 
subsidies or cross-subsidies to the hard-core poor. 
BRAC will plan to share information on eligibility and conditions for potential 
beneficiaries’ amounts of allocated grants and loans on website and brochure 
which will be accessible of all required information, posters for VWC and on 
union office. Information on programme activities will also be made available to 
beneficiaries through information boards placed at strategic locations. 
Implementing through information sharing with beneficiaries. 
 (WASH project proposal, p.44) 
Majority of our interviewees [WASH beneficiaries and BRAC officials] note that the use of 
participatory tools, such as PRA, made real differences in areas such as needs assessment, 
beneficiary selection and some resource allocation decisions relating to WASH intervention. 
By using the PRA technique, BRAC's field officials collected all the necessary data relating to 
socio-economic conditions of potential beneficiaries, availability of local resources, existing 
coverage, demand for WASH products etc. BRAC officials made the data available to the 
Village WASH Committees 8  (VWCs) for resource allocation decision-making and 
transparency purposes.  For example, 
… through the [Village WASH] Committees we are accountable to them 
(beneficiaries). … Our staff went house to house with a predetermined 
questionnaire containing demographic data, socio-economic data, water 
availability data, water use data, sanitation availability data and sanitation used 
data. These are all compiled. Matched with the social mapping that we have 
previously done, then made available to the WASH committee. …They have a 
choice of saying who gets it, where it should be placed so that maximum people 
can benefit from it. [BR3] 
BRAC and my committee9 [jointly] decided about who would get these [latrines] 
first. [B1] 
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...who will be eligible (for loan) or who will get that loan is decided by the WASH 
committee, is not decided by the BRAC.  [BR4] 
Our evidence shows that VWC and BRAC's field officials made joint decisions, such as who 
gets subsidised WASH products and where a particular WASH product (e.g. tube well) will be 
installed. This type of beneficiary participation in local level decision making has created an 
opportunity of ‘dialogical accountability’ (Uche, et al., 2016). It is also clear from our 
observation of VWC meetings and the focus group discussion with WASH beneficiaries (B2, 
B3, B4, B5, B6) that participation of beneficiaries in the decision making in terms of allocation 
of subsidised latrines to poor and marginalised was transparent.  
When asked by the researcher about the fairness of allocation of such latrines, it was clear that 
everyone who participated in the focus groups, conducted as part of this study, was happy about 
the basis of resource allocations to the beneficiaries (FGs 1, 2 and 3). The local level resource 
allocation decisions were transparent - the whole resource map of the village was in front of 
the VWC, and the poor households were jointly identified by BRAC staff and the VWCs.  
It is also evident from the field data that information, which includes the rights and 
responsibilities of beneficiaries; their potential contribution to the intervention; who gets what 
from BRAC; why free latrines are allocated to some beneficiaries only etc., was shared with 
the beneficiaries. This type of information sharing and their participation, although limited, 
provided beneficiaries a type of ownership of the project. Analysis of the WASH project 
proposal shows that there was a budgetary allocation for all of the above activities, and some 
of these have happened due to the donors’ ‘direct usage’ strategy (Frooman, 1999). 
While the above evidence shows that donors’ usage strategies helped in making an NGO 
accountable to its beneficiaries, our observation in another donor-driven initiative, complaints-
handling mechanism (Ombudsperson), gives a different picture. BRAC introduced a 
complaint-handling mechanism, ‘Independent’ Ombudsperson, in 2002. Although introduction 
of this service was a donor-driven initiative, which meant to benefit BRAC’s beneficiaries and 
other affected stakeholders, our evidence shows that BRAC’s Ombudsman service was used 
by BRAC's staff; there was no evidence of using this service by any of the BRAC's 
beneficiaries. One senior manager (BR1) notes:      
We have [an] Ombudsperson. Ombudsperson [is supposed to] cover every level, 
but unfortunately Ombudsperson was totally bogged down by staff grievances.   
None of our beneficiary interviewees knew about the service. BRAC's field officials also 
confirmed that there was no instruction for them to publicise the service to beneficiaries. It 
appears that BRAC took no initiative to make this information available to beneficiaries. The 
impact of this service on BRAC's staff was also limited. For example, one senior official from 
the Ombudsperson service notes, 
 “It is [the recommendations of Ombudsperson] non-binding.  ... BRAC authority, 
as far as I understand, look at the recommendations very carefully and … come to 
a decision. But, I feel that these recommendations should not be non-binding. 
[BR6] 
I see that all our recommendations are not implemented. Only 60%-65% [of our 
recommendations are] are implemented. [BR6] 
It is clear from this example that donors can easily hold a funded NGO accountable for enacting 
an accountability mechanism, such as Ombudsperson, (‘ex-ante accountability), but it is very 
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difficult for them to hold NGOs accountable for the outcomes (‘ex-post accountability) of some 
of the accountability activities (e.g. Ombudsperson service). Effectiveness of ‘ex-post’ 
accountability depends on monitoring of accountability process and the evaluation of post 
implementation accountability process. Our interviewees note that it is costly and difficult for 
a donor to monitor everything a funded NGO does (D1, D2). We found no evidence to suggest 
that BRAC's donors strictly monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of Ombudsperson.  
While there are some limited outcomes of donor-driven initiatives in promoting beneficiary 
accountability through BRAC, our recent evidence shows there have been some promising 
outcomes from the donor-regulator partnership. For example, one of our interviewees (R2) 
confirmed that microfinance beneficiaries and staff had been lodging complaints to the 
microfinance regulator (MRA) against some NGOs through using telephone hotline. 
Establishment of the complaints handling mechanism through a telephone hotline was 
proposed and funded by DfID [D3].   
DfID provided financial and training support to MRA in improving its capacity. According to 
our interviewees, the capacity building support from DfID was instrumental in protecting the 
interests of BRAC beneficiaries (D3, D4). For example, the Government of Bangladesh had 
been accusing the microfinance sector that they are charging excessive interest rates on poor 
and marginalised beneficiaries. The MRA initially failed to enact regulations to control interest 
rates on microfinance due to strong lobbying from MFIs. In 2001, MRA finally enacted 
regulations to cap interest on micro finance loans at 27 percent. Our interviewees confirmed 
that improved capabilities of MRA and firm government support played strong roles in 
reducing interest rates on micro credit (R1, R2). It is evident from the above discussion that 
donors can play an active role in promoting beneficiary accountability.      
6. Discussion and conclusion 
This paper examines the views of various stakeholders of a large international development 
NGO as to how donors’ influence strategies facilitate beneficiary accountability and what are 
the impacts of such strategies on beneficiary accountability. Our findings show that donors’ 
accountability requirements embed some provisions of beneficiary accountability mechanisms, 
such as participation, monitoring, evaluation and lessons learning, which help promote 
beneficiary accountability (Ebrahim, 2003). Donors’ monitoring and evaluations made 
implementation of such mechanisms ‘urgent’ (Mitchell, et al., 1997) to BRAC. Our analysis 
shows that, in the absence of such provisions in the funding proposals, donors asked them to 
include those provisions during the funding negotiations. While prior research (King & Lenox, 
2000) shows that NGOs use some of the participatory tools merely as a legitimisation tool, our 
evidence shows that beneficiary participation in BRAC's donor funded programme has created 
an opportunity for discharging accountability through ‘dialogues’ (Mulgan, 2000; Uche, et al., 
2016). We also found that the outcome of such ‘dialogues’ was active participation of 
beneficiaries in some local level decision-makings.    
 
Donors not only use their power to require the beneficiary accountability provisions, they also 
verify compliance by sending their representatives to the field. Our analysis also shows that 
donors take other proactive measures, such as providing funding for enhancing beneficiary 
accountability mechanisms and working with other NGOs and regulators in promoting 
beneficiary accountability. In the process of holding a funded NGO to account, donors’ 
accountability helps discharge beneficiary accountability. We have demonstrated that donors 
used ‘direct usage’ and ‘indirect usage’ strategies (Frooman, 1999) in influencing BRAC's 
accountability practices. ‘Direct usage’ strategy helped include some of the beneficiary 
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accountability mechanisms such as participation within a project, which was a form of ‘ex- 
ante’ accountability practice. We have also found that donors used ‘indirect usage’ strategy to 
mobilise the MF regulator in holding NGOs accountable to MF beneficiaries. This strategy 
clearly helped the regulator changing its status from a ‘collaborator’ to an ‘influencer’ (Miles, 
2017). 
We did not find the evidence of a donor applying ‘direct withholding’ or ‘indirect withholding’ 
strategies. It is apparent that, if an NGO does not comply with donors’ accountability 
requirements, the threat of the discontinuation of funding is implied. Given the significance of 
our case NGO to major donors, such as DfID and Dutch government, we argue that 
‘withholding’ was not a feasible strategy for the donors of a large NGO such as BRAC. Rather 
they have engaged with BRAC in a collaborative manner and deployed various ‘usage’ 
strategies (Frooman, 1999). 
While prior research (Dixon, et al., 2006; Khan, 2008) conceptually separated donor 
accountability and beneficiary accountability, we argue that they are not mutually exclusive. 
Donor accountability can be linked to beneficiary accountability, and while fulfilling donor 
accountability some of the beneficiary accountability can automatically be discharged, and 
some NGOs, such as Action Aid, are moving towards that direction (see, Ebrahim, 2009). One 
NGO practitioner argued that “donors are a key link in the accountability chain, and 
stakeholders expect donor representatives to ensure that action is taken when the humanitarian 
system does not perform well” (Kreidler, 2011, pp., p. 22). Our evidence provides support to 
arguments made by O’Dwyer and Unerman (2008) that donor accountability and beneficiary 
accountability are inter-linked.   
This paper makes several contributions to the NGO accountability literature. Firstly, it 
introduces a theoretical framework to the NGO accountability literature by drawing from 
Frooman (1999). It shows how powerful stakeholders’ - like donors – influence can be 
mobilised via various usage strategies to achieve the intended goal of enhancing beneficiary 
accountability.  
Secondly, we then go on to empirically illustrate the theoretical arguments presented earlier in 
the paper. Evidence for these empirical illustrations comes from a rich fieldwork-based case 
study consisting of interviews with BRAC’s employees, donors, regulator and observations 
and focus groups with beneficiaries. Empirically, we show that powerful donors, such as DfID 
and Dutch Government, directly influenced BRAC to implement beneficiary accountability 
mechanisms such as beneficiaries’ participation in local decision making in WASH 
programmes. We also show that one large donor (DfID) collaborated with a regulator (MRA) 
in Bangladesh to promote beneficiary friendly outcomes such as lowering interest rates in MF 
programmes and introducing a complaints-handling mechanism (telephone hotline) so that 
beneficiaries can lodge complaints directly with the regulator.  
Finally, we respond to the call for further research on operationalisation of beneficiary 
accountability (see, for example, O'Dwyer & Boomsma, 2015; Unerman & O'Dwyer, 2006a) 
by arguing that beneficiary accountability can be operationalised by invoking the under-
researched enabling features of donor accountability. Evidence from prior research 
(Agyemang, et al., 2017) does not show a complete portrayal of donor accountability with all 
its enabling features. Our findings provide support for more enabling features of donors’ 
accountability in facilitating beneficiary accountability. We argue that, in the absence of 
beneficiaries’ power in holding an NGO to account, donors can play a proactive role in terms 
of making NGOs accountable to beneficiaries.  
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In addition to the above noted implications for NGO accountability theory, this study has 
implications for policy and practice on NGO accountability. We argue that policy makers 
should pay more attention in enhancing the role of donors in promoting beneficiary 
accountability. Attention should be paid to mobilise the powers held by the donors to the 
advantage of beneficiaries. Both the NGOs and donors can play significant roles in promoting 
accountability to beneficiaries. Sometimes, NGOs are alienated and distracted from serving 
beneficiaries’ needs as a result of rigid accountability requirements by donors (see Dixon et al., 
2006). In this paper, we have labelled them as constraining features of donor accountability by 
NGOs. However, donors, NGOs and other policy makers might do well by promoting the 
enabling features of donor accountability highlighted in this paper.  
This case study has been conducted on a large international development NGO based in 
Bangladesh. We encourage further empirical investigations in other settings to examine the 
theoretical arguments put forward in this paper. We have examined one way to operationalise 
beneficiary accountability by mobilising the enabling features of donor accountability. We 
invite researchers to explore other ways of operationalising beneficiary accountability. We note 
that donors’ power and priorities may change over time. A longitudinal study on changes in 
donors’ accountability requirements can investigate how changes in donors’ influence and 































Table 1: Profiles of interviewees 
 
Interviewee code Position of interviewees 
BR1 BRAC's senior manager 
BR2 BRAC’s mid-level manager 
BR3 BRAC’s senior manager 
BR4 BRAC’s field manager 
BR5 BRAC's senior manager 
BR6 BRAC's senior manager 
B1 BRAC beneficiary 
B2 BRAC beneficiary 
B3 BRAC beneficiary 
B4 BRAC beneficiary 
B5 BRAC beneficiary 
B6 BRAC beneficiary 
D1 Donor representative 
D2 Donor representative 
D3 Donor representative 
D4 Donor representative 
R1 Regulator 
R2 Regulator 
FG1 Focus group with beneficiaries 
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1 BRAC stands for Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee. 
2Australian Government Aid Agency. 
3 The accountability initiatives by the MRA were not fully operational during the first two field 
visits. Our data updates allowed us to gather data relating to the effectiveness of the 
implementation of these initiatives.   
4PRA is a tool which promotes the participation of potential beneficiaries in assessing their 
needs. 
5 NGOs which offer microfinance (MF) services are called microfinance institutions (MFIs). 
Many MFIs in Bangladesh are registered as NGOs. Our case study organisation, BRAC, is an 
NGO and an MFI. Hence, we used the NGO and MFI interchangeably. 
6 Collateral free group-based MF model introduced in Bangladesh in early 1980s received 
world-wide attention. Microfinance pioneer, Professor Muhammad Yunus, and the Grameen 
Bank received Nobel Prize in 2006. 
7 https://www.ft.com/content/fd16a1f0-ecea-11df-9912-00144feab49a date accessed 
26/03/2017. 
8A VWC is consisted of 11 members of a community including 5 female and 6 male members. 




                                                          
